The paper adds to the scattered empirical evidence on the role of obstacles to innovation in a three-fold way. First, we correct for the usual sample selection bias by filtering out firms not interested in innovation from 'potential innovators'. We then analyse the impact of obstacles on the translation of firms' engagement in innovative activities onto actual innovative outputs. Second, we assess what mostly affects firms' rate of failure in this process, whether finance or, rather, knowledge or demand-related constraints. Third, we do so in a panel framework, which allows to account for endogeneity and firms' unobserved heterogeneity through individual effects. We find that demand-and market-related factors are as important as financing conditions in determining firms' innovation failures. This evidence puts much of the latest hype on finance in perspective and brings back into the picture traditional demand and market structure arguments of why firms fail to innovate. The empirical analysis is based on an unbalanced panel of firm data from four waves of the UK Community Innovation Survey (CIS) between 2002 and 2010 merged with the UK Business Structure Database.
Introduction
Recent empirical innovation literature has devoted increasing attention to the perception of (mainly financial) obstacles to innovation and their deterring impact on firms' decisions to engage in innovation activity, the intensity of this engagement and the propensity to innovate (among others, and more in detail in Section 2, Baldwin and Lin, 2002; Galia and Legros, 2004; Canepa and Stoneman, 2007; Segarra Blasco et al, 2008; Tiwari et al., 2008; Savignac, 2008; Iammarino et al., 2009; Mancusi and Vezzulli, 2010) .
Assessing the actual impact of obstacles on the innovation failure/success rate is of clear policy relevance, as removing or alleviating hindrances may be an effective device to enlarge the population of innovators and increase the innovation performance of the existing base of innovators (D'Este et al., 2008 (D'Este et al., , 2010 (D'Este et al., and 2012 . However, an overwhelming majority of contributions has confined analysis to the impact of financial obstacles. The marked emphasis on financial conditions to innovate originates from traditional cash-flow models (see Hall, 2002 for a review) -focusing on firms' financial constraints to carry out R&D investments -and most likely reflects the recent unfavourable financial downturn. Also, the implicit rationale of limiting the analysis on financial constraints is that -once ascertained that firms do not innovate because they lack liquidity or innovation costs are too high-it is relatively straightforward to draw policy implications: financing constraints are removed or at least alleviated by pouring liquidity in the form of additional subsidies/tax credits to increase levels of (mainly R&D) investments.
Here we argue that firms might encounter different types of obstacles and persist in their systemic failure in engaging in innovation activities and/or in translating financial effort into the actual introduction of successful new goods, services and processes 1 . It is therefore all the more important for policy purposes to extend the analysis to non-financial obstacles and be able to provide evidence on whether firms do not innovate due to the lack of appropriate information on technologies and market, or adequate skills, or, most likely in the midst of a financial crisis, because their destinations markets are sluggish in ensuring adequate levels of demand 2 .
This paper aims to add to the evidence on the impact of obstacles to innovation and the implications in terms of innovation policy in four main respects.
First, in line with some of the most recent contributions (D'Este et al., 2008 and 2012; Savignac, 2008; Mancusi and Vezzulli, 2010) we are aware of and correct for the potential sample selection bias intrinsic to this type of analysis, by appropriately identifying the relevant sample and filtering out those firms which are not willing to innovate and therefore do not engage in any innovation activity for reasons others than obstacles. This allows overcoming the usual selection bias, which has led to the counterintuitive evidence of a positive relation between intensity of innovative investments and perception of obstacles to innovation (Mohnen and Rosa, 2000; Baldwin and Lin, 2002) .
Second, this paper builds on the empirical evidence provided by D'Este et al. (2008, 2012) , who distinguish between deterring and revealed barriers 3 , and extends it by assessing the impact of 'revealed' barriers on the translation of innovative input into actual innovative output. In doing so, we are able to tell whether -even though firms choose to engage in innovative activities, that is they spend financial resources not only for intramural or extramural R&D but also for capital equipment, training, acquisition of know-how and 2 Recent empirical evidence at micro and macro level on the effects of the economic downturn on innovation investments of firms and countries is provided in Archibugi and Filippetti, 2011; Archibugi, Filippetti and Frenz, 2012 3 The distinction is based on the relation between the degree of engagement in innovation activity and the perceived importance of constraints to innovation. Deterring barriers prevent firms from engaging at all in innovation activities, while revealed barriers are experienced "in the making" of innovation and reflect firms' awareness of their constraints as a result of their engagement in innovation inputs.
marketing -the presence of barriers represents a substantial hindrance to the completion of their innovation projects and the launch of new products or processes 4 .
Third, we carefully distinguish between financial and non-financial obstacles and, unlike in Tiwari et al. (2008) or Blanchard et al. (2013) , we provide evidence on whether other systemic types of obstacles such as those related to access to knowledge, market structure, demand or regulations, have a similar or more important deterring effect than finance in limiting firms' ability to translate innovation activities into new outputs 5 .
Fourth, we do so within a panel econometric framework, drawing on the UK CIS4 to CIS7 panel, merged with the UK Business Structure data, in order to account for usual econometric issues such as endogeneity and firms' unobserved heterogeneity. The longitudinal evidence at our disposal also allows pinning down from a descriptive point of view whether a certain degree of persistence occurs in the status of "not innovation oriented", "failed innovator" or "innovator" over time 6 . This information, coupled with the evidence on what type of barrier is most likely to affect firms' innovation status, is of uttermost importance for policy purposes, as it allows identifying the relevant areas and target population for intervention.
Policy makers might prioritize the enlargement of the population of innovative-active firms (innovation-widening), by removing or alleviating obstacles that prevent firms to engage in innovation activities; or strengthen the innovation capacity of the existing 4 For the purpose of this paper, we do not focus on the degree of novelty of the product and therefore do not distinguish between goods or service new to the firm versus new to the market. Rather, we adopt a less conservative choice of focusing on the simple introduction of a product/process new to the firms or new to the market. 5 It is important to point out here (see also Section 3) that within the innovation-survey literature the term "innovation active" refers to the degree to which firms devote financial effort to innovation (innovative inputs). This does not entail that the firm has also managed to introduce a new product or process as a consequence of the innovation investments. This distinction is central to our argument and often undermined in the traditional literature on financing constraints (see Section 2.1). 6 We fully describe the status of innovator, failed innovator and not innovation-oriented in Section 4.3.
population of innovative-active firms (innovation-deepening), by removing or alleviating obstacles that obstruct successful completion of innovation projects and adequate returns to innovation investments. This paper aims to provide evidence to help this type of policy choice.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on barriers to innovation, briefly reporting the econometric issues arising from this analysis. Section 3 describes in depth the relevant variables included in the merged UK CIS4-CIS7 and BSD panel data. Section 4 illustrates the econometric strategy and the decisions undertaken to identify the relevant sample 7 . Section 5 discusses the results, highlighting the main contributions of this analysis with respect to the existing literature. Section 6 builds upon this evidence to discuss the innovation policy implications of going beyond the hype on financing constraints.
Finance versus non-finance barriers to innovation
The literature analysing the factors affecting firms' failure in engaging in innovation is comparatively less extended than the core body of literature focusing on factors of success (briefly reviewed in Section 4.1). This is slightly puzzling, given the policy relevance of identifying (and releasing) factors obstructing firms' decisions to innovate, hampering financial effort devoted to it and completion of successful innovation projects. Identifying factors of success does not implicitly entail pinning down the determinants of failure: it would be a myopic policy assumption to infer this. For instance, if large firms are more likely to introduce an innovation, this does not mean that all small firms face problems in being 7 Comparison of the different estimations results shows that these are robust to the sample identified and to other selectivity issues. Other robustness checks are reverted to in the Appendix.
successful. It is therefore of uttermost importance to identify what kinds of hindrances firms meet at different phases of the innovation cycle, i.e. in the decision to innovate, the engagement in innovation activities and the successful introduction of a new product/process.
Here we systematize the few contributions that have dealt with these issues, distinguishing between financial and non-financial obstacles 8 .
The origins: financing constraints and R&D investments
The large majority of contributions interested in the (direct) effect of hampering factors on innovation activity at large (including both innovation-related expenditures (inputs), and the introduction of innovation outputs) have focused on (external) financing constraints on firms' cash flow sensitivity to afford R&D investments (for a review, see Schiantarelli, 1996 and Hall, 2002 ; see also Bond et al., 1999 and Hottenrott and Peters, 2012) . These contributions are concerned with the effect of financing constraints on the risk of a sub-optimal and welfare-reducing firms' level of investments. In particular, they all focus on the high uncertainty, asymmetries and market complexity specifically linked to the financial returns of R&D investments and the ability to attract external funds. Most studies test the presence of financing constraints indirectly, by looking at the sensitivity of R&D investments to changes in cash flows, as in Hall (2008) . Other studies (Canepa and Stoneman, 2007; Savignac, 2008; Hottenrott and Peters, 2012) employ innovation surveys to access direct information on the perception of financing constraints by firms. Empirical findings tend to confirm that encountering financial constraints significantly lower the likelihood of firms to engage in innovative activities (Savignac, 2008) and this pattern is more pronounced in small firms and high-tech sectors (Canepa and Stoneman, 2007 and the perception of financial and non-financial constraints, which we briefly review below.
Facing barriers, engaging in innovation activities and propensity to innovate: CIS evidence
The data provided by CIS allow enlarging the analysis on the role of obstacles in two main directions. First, it provides a direct indicator on the perception of obstacles to innovation, which goes beyond the financial obstacles only. This includes perception of knowledge and information-related barriers, market structure, demand and regulation obstacles. Second, it allows investigating whether this whole range of barriers affect firms' behaviour at different stages of the innovation cycle, whether on the decision to innovate, the engagement in innovation activities (which go beyond the traditional R&D expenditures) and the successful introduction of a new product/process. CIS-based literature in this field has variously explored issues of complementarities between different innovation obstacles (Galia and Legros 2004; Mohnen and Röller, 2005) ; the links between factors affecting the perception of the importance of different barriers to innovation (Baldwin and Lin, 2002; Iammarino et al., 2009; D'Este et al., 2012) ; the impact of (mainly financial) obstacles to innovation (Tourigny and Le, 2004; Savignac, 2008; Tiwari et al., 2008; Mancusi and Vezzulli, 2010; Blanchard et al., 2013) . 9 Rather than using traditional innovation survey data on the perception of obstacles to innovation, Hall (2008) and later Hottenrott and Peters (2012) conduct an ideal experiment by providing firms with exogenous extra cash and observe whether they decide to spend it in innovation projects. The presence of (external) financing constraints is detected by decisions to devote extra cash to otherwise unfunded innovation projects.
Two key issues are worth mentioning here. First of all, most of the empirical findings converge in pointing to a positive relationship between engagement in innovation and perception of barriers. In trying to make sense of this counterintuitive evidence, Savignac (2008) and D'Este et al., (2008) identify sources of potential bias, which explain the positive spurious correlation between innovation intensity and perception of obstacles and the counter-intuitive results emerging from these analyses. These sources of bias include the usual ones -such as the presence of heterogeneous unobserved firms' specific factors or the simultaneity of the status of spending for innovation projects and facing obstacles to innovation. Also, a specific source of bias is linked to an inappropriate selection of the relevant sample for the analysis, which does not distinguish between firms willing and not willing (or needing) to innovate, as suggested by Savignac (2008 ) and D'Este et al. (2008 , 2012 . Building on their work, subsequent contributions have therefore carefully selected the relevant sample (of firms willing to innovate and potentially failed by the presence of obstacles) and obtained expected signs (Mancusi and Vezzulli, 2010; Blanchard et al., 2013) 10 .
Secondly, also within the CIS-based literature, an overwhelming number of contributions focus on financing constraints to innovation, treating the role of non-financial ones as a simple control factor (Tiwari et al., 2008; Mancusi and Vezzulli, 2010; Blanchard et al., 2013) . Despite recognizing the fundamental -possibly exacerbating -role of other types of obstacles indirectly on the financing ones and directly on the innovation intensity of firms, none of these contributions choose to provide a detail picture of other systemic sources of innovation failure 11 .
The present work aims to contribute to provide such a picture, in the belief that the evidence-based identification of the characteristics of firms not willing to innovate on the one hand and those of firms willing to innovate, spending in innovation and failing introduction of new products on the other hand is crucial to target policy intervention.
Policy makers might prioritize the enlargement of the population of innovators, by removing or alleviating obstacles targeted to those firms that decide not to engage in innovation activities due to barriers (for an innovation-widening policy strategy); and/or strengthen the innovation capacity of the existing population of innovators, by removing or alleviating obstacles affecting firms who do not manage to translate financial effort devoted to innovation projects into the actual introduction of new product/process (for an innovationdeepening policy strategy).
Data
The empirical analysis is based on firm-level data from four waves of the UK Community Innovation Survey ( between applying panel econometric techniques that allow us to perform more precise estimations, though leading to a significant reduction of the sample size, or wiping out the time series dimension in favour of a higher level of representativeness of the sample used for the analyses. We choose to opt for the first option, as we prefer to prioritise taking into account the unobservable firm heterogeneity 16 . Accordingly, after dropping those firmspertaining to both the total sample and the relevant sample -that are observed for just one year (31,577); those operating in the primary and construction sectors (2,767 observations);
those with missing values in all the variables used for our analysis (9,280 observations) we 13 The appendix reports the section of the UKIS questionnaire on barriers to innovation. These include cost, knowledge, market and regulation barriers. 14 The information on group belongings and on public financial support for innovation are not available due to slightly changes in the questionnaire designs through the four surveys. 15 Since CIS data are collected retrospectively (innovating over the past three years), the 9 years period pertaining to the four different surveys allows us to have data just for four time periods. 16 As a robustness check we estimated a pooled probit model using a sample that includes also those firms observed just for one year. The results -available upon request -are consistent (both in terms of the sign and statistical significance of the estimated coefficients) with those discussed in Section 4.4.
ended up with an unbalanced panel of 16,316 firms-year observations. 
Empirical analysis

Econometric strategy and specification
We analyse the impact of different types of obstacles to innovation on the firm's propensity to innovate 17 . In doing so we consider the following equation:
Where · is an indicator function that takes on values 1 if the argument in brackets is true, and zero otherwise, is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is innovative. is a set of explanatory variables including the 'traditional' determinants of a firm's decision to innovate, is a vector of variables identifying different obstacles to innovation, is the time invariant unobserved individual effect, and an idiosyncratic error term.
As for the set of traditional determinants of innovation ( ), we first consider firm size measured as the logarithm of the firm's total number of employees (LSIZE). As initially pointed out by Schumpeter (1942) , and subsequently emphasised by several authors, larger firms are more inclined to engage in innovation activity because they are less likely to be affected by liquidity constraints (easier access to external finance and larger internal funds) and can exploit the advantages deriving by economies of scale (see Cohen and Klepper, 1996; Mairesse and Mohnen, 2002) .
Firms' propensity to innovate is also affected by market structure and conditions in terms of competitiveness. In this respect, a firm operating in an international context should be more prone to engage in innovation activity because of the high level of competition that characterises the global arena (e.g. Archibugi and Iammarino, 1999; Narula and Zanfei, 2003) . Accordingly, we use a binary indicator of international competition (EXPORT_d), which equals to 1 if a firm's most significant destination market is international, and to 0 otherwise.
As suggested by Piva and Vivarelli (2009) , higher manpower skills can be related to a higher firm propensity to innovate. In fact, skilled workers in comparisons with their unskilled counterparts are more able to dealing with complexity, and more successful in exploiting innovative ideas (Song et al., 2003) . We therefore introduce a variable proxing the proportion of high skilled employees (engineers and graduates) within a firm (EDUHIGH).
The occurrence of other forms of innovation, with particular reference to those involving changes in the organisational structure of a firm has been shown to be complementary to more traditional sources of innovation (see Bresnahan et al., 2002; Hitt and Brynjolfsson, 2002) . Accordingly, we expect a positive impact of the binary variable 'IORG_d' -that identifies the implementation of major changes to organisational structureon the firm' probability to engage in innovation.
We also use firm's age (AGE) to control for age related effects. We do not advance any hypothesis on the possible effect of firm's age on the probability to innovate because no univocal evidence has been provided by the literature. Keppler (1996) proposes a theoretical model according to which the number of innovations per firm at a given moment is higher, the younger the cohort of firm is. This should imply a negative relationship between the firm's age and its probability of innovating. However, as Galande and De la Fuente (2003) pointed out, the firm's age can also be seen as a proxy of the firm' knowledge and experience accumulated by the time and consequently it should be positively related to innovation.
Also, we introduce a dummy variable (INNEXP_d) that takes on value 1 if a firm has invested in innovation activity 18 .
In addition, we control for the important role played by specific sector and technological factors in affecting the firm's propensity to introduce a new product/process, by including a complete set of industry dummies. Finally, in all the specifications we include time dummies to take into account possible business cycle effects, and regional dummies in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity across different UK regions.
The vector in equation (1), includes 4 different dummies variables 19 that take on value 1 if the firm has faced obstacle to innovation related to: 1) costs factors 18 In principle, it would have been better to consider a continuous variable measuring a firm's total investment in innovation activity; however to improve the readability of the results, we opted in favour of a dummy variable. Results based on the inclusion of the continuous variable indicating level of innovation expenditure are consistent with the binary variable and available on request by the authors. 19 As can be seen from table A4 in the appendix, the respondents to UKIS questionnaire are asked to report on their perception of the degree of importance (low, medium, high) of each barriers item. Although this additional information could be useful to perform more detailed analyses, the selfreported nature of the answers cast strong doubts on their reliability. Accordingly, we confine our attention to the 4 binary variables that identify those firms that have experienced obstacles to innovation. Nonetheless, as robustness checks, we estimate equation (1) The incidental parameter problem (Neyman and Scott, 1948) little within-variation, this method could lead to biased results (because of multicollinearity problems). Unfortunately, as shown in Table 2 , this is what exactly happens with the data at our disposal. All the explanatory variables show a correlation coefficient with their within means always above 70 per cent. As a consequence, by using this estimation method, some of the variables become uninformative and turn out to be insignificant (see columns 3 and 6 of Table 3 ). Accordingly, the results obtained by considering the specification with the means have to be considered as a simple benchmark of the more reliable results of the RE specification (equation (1)) 22 . between the composite error terms in different periods for the same individuals, the correspondent results are used as a benchmark. However, the high level of significance of the likelihood ratio test for Rho equal to zero (lower part of columns 2) suggests that the unobserved heterogeneity appears to be important in explaining the innovative decision of a firm thus supporting the choice of a random effects specification. 22 Although the dataset at our disposal would allow us to perform some dynamic analysis by taking into account the lags of the dependent variables, due to the short time dimension of our panel we prefer to confine our analysis to static specifications (see Table 3 ). However, we performed some robustness checks controlling for the effect of the state dependence by applying a dynamic probit model method proposed by Wooldridge (2005) . As expected, the results in Table A1 in the appendix mainly confirm the conclusions based on the discussed in section 4.2.
< INSERT TABLE 2 >
Full sample results: counter-intuitive findings
Looking at the results in columns 2, we find the expected signs for all the traditional determinants of innovation activities. More in details, larger firms, firms that have introduced organisational changes, and that are more oriented towards international markets are also more likely to translate their innovative effort into innovative outputs. Moreover, as expected, those firms that invest in innovation activities, as well as those that hire high qualified workers seem to be more likely to introduce innovation output. As for the impact of the variable AGE, our results seem to support the evidence that younger firms are more likely than their mature counterparts to realise innovative products and/or processes.
Looking at the main variables of interest, the signs of the coefficients of the different obstacles to innovation are in line with the counterintuitive findings of most of the literature mentioned in Section 2.2. Three out of four of these variables, namely 'HIND_COST_d' (financial obstacles), 'HIND_KNOW_d' (knowledge obstacles) and 'HIND_MARK_d'
(market structure/demand obstacles) turn out to have a positive and highly significant impact on the firm's propensity to innovate. The only variable that shows an expected negative sign is the variable 'HIND_REG_d' (5 per cent of significance level). As already mentioned in Section 2.2, these counter-intuitive results are a recurrent problem in the CIS-literature on barriers to innovation, due to several sources of bias (D'Este et al., 2008 (D'Este et al., , 2012 Savignac, 2008; Mancusi and Vezzulli, 2010) . We deal with this in the next two sections by appropriately selecting the relevant sample of firms.
Selecting the relevant sample
One of the possible causes of the counterintuitive positive impact of experiencing barriers and propensity to innovate emerging from our pooled sample results -and consistent with a good deal of contributions in the innovation literature reviewed in Section 2.3 -is related to the specific design of the CIS questionnaires. Although mainly focused on 'innovation-related' questions, CIS also gathers information on not innovative firms. All the surveyed firms are required to answer the section referred to the obstacles to innovation (see Table A4 and A5 in the Appendix). Firms might well decide that they do not need to innovate due to lack of interest, or because they have already innovated recently (and therefore in principle they do not experience obstacles); firms might also decide that they do need or are willing to innovate and indeed spend in innovation inputs (potential innovators) but they do not manage to introduce any new product/process (failed innovators); some firms do decide to innovate and indeed devote financial resources to innovation activities as well as manage to introduce a new output (innovators). Tables A2, A4 , A5 in the Appendix) and the role played by the obstacle to innovation. More specifically, we identify the following categories of firms and select out those that are not relevant to the present analysis, to target the relevant sample.
Not-innovation Oriented Firms: firms that are not willing to innovate, as they have declared to have not introduced any new product and/or process innovation as a result of a deliberate choice and were not in process of doing so. At the same time, they did not experience any barriers to innovation (i.e. had not experienced any of the 10 obstacles included in the question on barriers, see Table A4 ) regardless of whether they have invested or not in any innovation activities 23 .
Potential Innovators: firms that are willing to innovate, either as they managed to introduce new products/processes (i.e. that has answered positively at least one of the three questions listed in Table A2 ) or they engaged in innovation activities (investments). At the same time, they have experienced at least one of the barriers to innovation.
Failed Innovators: firms that are willing to innovate (i.e. that are part of the sample of 'potential innovators'), i.e. they did engage in innovation activities but did not manage to translate innovation inputs into actual introduction of a new product/process.
Innovators: firms that are willing to innovate (i.e. that are part of the sample of 'potential innovators') and that have managed to introduce new or significantly improved product or process regardless of whether they have or not experienced any barriers to innovation.
< INSERT FIGURE 1 >
The distribution of firms in the total sample as well as some descriptive statistics computed according these four categories are shown in Table 4 and 5. In fact, the 'innovators' in comparison with the two other categories of firms (failed and not innovation oriented firms) turn out to be more oriented towards external market, more prone to implement organizational change and hire highly educated people.
< INSERT TABLE 4 > < INSERT TABLE 5 >
As for the variables identifying the different obstacles to innovation, from the lower part of Table 4 , surprisingly, no particular differences emerge between the category of 'failed innovators' and 'innovators'. The percentage of firms that have experienced obstacles to innovation is always very high ranging from 68 per cent of 'failed firms' that have experienced regulations factors, to the 90 per cent of 'innovators' that have experienced at least one of the 4 different cost factors obstacles. Table 6 and 7 show the transition probabilities respectively from the 'not innovationoriented' to the 'potential innovator' status and from the 'potential innovator' to the 'innovator' status. More in detail Table 6 reports the frequency of a firm changing status over time from 'not-innovation oriented' to 'potential innovators' (and vice versa), while Table 7 shows the shifts from the status of 'failed innovators' to 'innovators' (in both directions). Not surprisingly, the 'willingness' to innovate is the firm' characteristic that shows the highest level of persistence over time, with roughly 94 per cent of 'potential innovators' in one period persisting in this status over the following time period 25 . On the other hand a substantial share (around 43 per cent) of firms that are 'not-innovation oriented', become "willing to innovate" in the subsequent time period. This might be due to two different strategies. Either the firm has already innovated in the previous period (say t-1) so that it states to be not willing to innovate in t and eventually goes back to a "willing to innovate" status in t+1 26 . The second scenario is that these firms are dominated by market incumbents (See Table A5 "No need to market conditions") or any other market-related factor, such as the lack of a dynamic demand or some form of constraint on the consumer side. In this case, our conjecture is that the status of "not willingness" is likely to be assimilated to one in which the firm has actually encountered some form of market-related barrier 27 .
By the same token, Table 7 shows that while the status of 'innovators' shows a relatively high persistence over time (almost 74 per cent of firms remain in the same status over time), it appears that nearly 47 per cent of firms that in t-1 belonged into the category of 'failed innovator' have changed their status becoming 'innovators' in t. This high share of firms, which have most likely managed to overcome barriers to innovation and introduce a new product or process, is also of great interest from a policy perspective. We suspect that much of the story here is due to the time-lag of returns to innovation or the timing of adjustment needed to meet regulations, ensure demand response to the diffusion of innovation or the acquisition of adequate skills or information on markets or technologies 28 .
This evidence, although based on descriptive analyses, shows how important is identifying the relevant areas of intervention in order to implement targeted policy instruments.
25 Due to the particular construction of CIS questionnaires, here one time period refers to 2 years. 26 This is an interesting case to explore in our future research agenda, as such cyclical shifts in status would challenge much of the literature on innovation persistency. 27 We reserve to investigate these issues by disentangling the responses to the questions reported in Table A5 in our future work. 28 Once again, this is certainly a topic for future investigation.
< INSERT TABLE 6> < INSERT TABLE 7 >
Dealing with selection: relevant sample results
The estimation results (marginal effects) for the "relevant sample" 29 of firms are reported in columns 4 to 6 in Table 3 . The first remarkable result is that the estimated coefficients associated to the relevant variables show the expected negative sign in three cases out of four, the only variable still showing a positive -albeit not significantcoefficients being 'HIND_KNOW_d' 30 . In particular, looking at the probit RE model (column 5), the presence of obstacles to innovation related to costs/market/regulations factors significantly reduce the firm's propensity to fall into the category of 'innovators' by respectively 24.5 per cent, 12.7 per cent and 11.6 per cent. Accordingly, although the costrelated factors still appear to be the most relevant constraint to the firm' realisation of innovative outputs, our results clearly show a noticeable "hindrance effect" of other obstacles to innovation (namely market/demand and regulations related factors).
This evidence explicitly calls for a careful reflection on the opportunity to persist on the "hype" on financing-related barriers -and for what matters on the financing of innovation more in general. Other systemic failures hindering the firms' innovative performance emerge to be equally important in affecting firms' behaviour and innovation success, though these are much less straightforwardly addressable (see next section for a more detailed discussion of the policy implication of these results).
29 As a reminder, the relevant sample selects out those firms which are "not-innovation oriented". 30 Although still positive, the impact of this variable on the firm's propensity to innovate is negligible in terms of magnitude and not significant. Moreover, the marginal effects of this variable turn out to be (expectedly) negative in the 'RE with means' model (columns 6).
The relevance of these results is further corroborated by their robustness across the different models. In particular, comparing the results of the probit RE without means (columns 5) and with means (columns 6) we can see that the estimated marginal effects of the variables "HIND_COST_d", "HIND_MARK_d" and "HIND_REG_d" are extremely close in terms of magnitude.
Looking at the other regressors (the 'traditional' determinants of innovation) and in line with the results obtained using the total sample, larger, younger firms, firms implementing organizational change and more prone to trade in international market are also more likely to introduce innovative outputs. Moreover, it is worth noting that these results are very similar in terms of magnitude to the estimated marginal effects with those one in columns 2.
Concluding remarks
This paper aims to add to the scattered conceptual and empirical literature on barriers to innovation and allow innovation policy makers to gather a in-depth picture of what are the systemic failures hampering firms' engagement in innovation activities and innovation performance.
As in Savignac (2008 ) and D'Este et al. (2008 and 2012 , we identify different policy target categories on the basis of firms' self-declarations in terms of willingness, need and not need to innovate. We then corroborate this a-priori classification by testing the actual impact of different obstacles to innovation on the propensity to innovate -given the engagement in at least one innovation investment.
Once selected the appropriate sample of firms 'willing to innovate', we then test
whether, to what extent (and which) barriers affect the changing status of 'potential innovators' into 'failed innovators', i.e. which of the main systemic obstacles mostly affect the lack of returns of innovation investments in terms of new product/process.
We find that market structure and lack of demand are as important hindrances for firms as the financing constraints that the most traditional literature has emphasized on the basis of cash-flow models. We therefore infer that the presence of strong competitors and the lack of demand are as decisive for firms to give up innovation projects despite an initial investment, as are financial constraints.
It is therefore of uttermost importance for policy makers aiming at sustaining innovation to focus not just on the traditional increase of liquidity via, e.g. R&D tax credits, but also to be able to construct a concerted 'policy platform' embracing competition and macro-economic policy. Economic downturn, raising unemployment and lack of adequate final demand not only affect macro-economic recession directly but also indirectly via reducing incentives for firms to invest in innovation (for a discussion, see Archibugi and Filippetti, 2011) .
Regulation constraints -which turn out to be significantly affecting the propensity to innovate, though more weakly -have to be considered as a potential area for intervention too, though more in depth investigation on the nature of these types of constraints must be carried out, possibly from a qualitative perspective.
Overall, policy makers might prioritize the enlargement of the population of innovators, by removing or alleviating obstacles targeted to those firms that decide not to engage in innovation activities due to barriers (for an innovation-widening policy strategy);
and/or strengthen the innovation capacity of the existing population of innovators, by removing or alleviating obstacles affecting firms who do not manage to translate financial effort devoted to innovation projects into the actual introduction of new product/process (for an innovation-deepening policy strategy). In any of these cases, the evidence presented in this paper shed lights on the relevant issues and allows a better identification of the relevant policy targets. -8,102.88 -7,919.81 -7,753.45 -7,392.13 -7,228.56 -7,151 0.752 (0.032) Notes; ***, ** and * indicate significance on a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors in brackets (calculated using the delta method). Time, industry and regional dummies are included. In all the specifications the dependent variable is a dummy that takes on value 1 if the firm can be defined as an innovator YES NO 1. During the three-year period -----, did your enterprise introduce:
 New or significantly improved goods. (Exclude the simple resale of new goods purchased from other enterprises and changes of a purely cosmetic nature)  New or significantly improved services 2. During the three-year period -----, did your enterprise introduce any new or significantly improved processes for producing or supplying products (goods or services) which were new to your enterprise?
3. During the three-year period -----, did your enterprise introduce any new or significantly improved processes for producing or supplying products (goods or services) which were new to your industry?
4. During the three-year period -----, did your enterprise have any innovation activities to develop product or process innovations that you had to abandon or which were ongoing at the end of 2004? 
Variables identifying the different sub-samples of firms according our definitions
POTEN_INN
Dummy =1 if firm is a potentially innovative firms (whether the firm has been engaged in innovation activities and/or has experienced any barrier to innovation activities during the three year period); 0 otherwise.
INNOVATORS
Dummy =1 if firm has introduced new or significantly improved products/processes or has any innovation activities that had abandon or which were ongoing at the end of the three year period ; 0 otherwise.
FAILED_INN
Dummy =1 if firm wanted to innovate but did not managed to do so because has experienced any barriers to innovation activity during the three year period; 0 otherwise.
NOINN_OR
Dummy =1 if firm has no innovative activities and did not experienced any barriers to innovation during the three year period; 0 otherwise.
Explanatory variables
AGE Years elapsed since founding.
EXPORT_d Dummy =1 if the firm have traded in an international market during the three year period; 0 otherwise. EDUHIGH Ratio of highly educated personnel over total employment (these figures refer to the last year of each of the three years periods).
INNEXP_d
Dummy=1 if the firm has invested in at least one out of the 7 categories of innovation activity included in the questionnaire.
IORG_d
Dummy=1 if the firm have implemented major changes to its organisational structure (e.g. Introduction of cross-functional teams, outsourcing of major business function) during the three year period; 0 otherwise.
LSIZE
Log of the total number of firm's employees (these figures refer to the last year of each of the three years periods).
Obstacles to innovation
HIND_COST_d Dummy=1 if the firm has faced obstacle to innovation related to costs factors in the three years period; 0 otherwise.
HIND_KNOW_d
Dummy=1 if the firm has faced obstacle to innovation related to knowledge factors; 0 otherwise.
HIND_MARK_d
Dummy=1 if the firm has faced obstacle to innovation related to market factors; 0 otherwise.
HIND_REG_d
Dummy=1 if the firm has faced obstacle to innovation related to other factors during the three year period; 0 otherwise. 
